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Causes of business to government (B2G) corruption in 1 
tendering and bidding in China 2 
Bing Zhang1; Yun Le2; Bo Xia3; and Martin Skitmore4 3 
Abstract: Business to government (B2G) corruption is thought to be a common phenomenon in the 4 
Chinese construction sector, especially in public construction projects, inducing many accidents and 5 
losses. As a precursor to its reduction, or elimination, this paper examines the reasons for B2G corruption 6 
by identifying the causes and their relative influence in the tendering and bidding process. To do this, a 7 
total of 24 causes are first identified through literature review and the results of semi-structured 8 
interviews with 9 top construction enterprise managers in China’s construction market. An opinion 9 
questionnaire survey is further used to rank and analyze the causes. A factor analysis is also used to reveal 10 
six major underlying causal dimensions of B2G corruption, comprising flawed regulation systems, 11 
negative encouragement, lack of professional ethics and codes of conduct, illegitimate gains, lack of 12 
competitive and equitable bidding practices and procedures and the influence of guanxi. Concluding 13 
remarks include the study’s potential contribution to practice and regulation in the fight against corruption 14 
in the Chinese construction industry. 15 
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INTRODUCTION 20 
The construction sector has been identified as the most corrupt industry in the world (de Jong et al., 2009, 21 
Hardoon and Heinrich, 2011) and almost all phases of construction projects have become problem areas 22 
(Stansbury, 2005). The term of bidding is the moment in which bidders enter their price bidds and 23 
tendering starts with the Request For Proposals and ends with the contract award, be merged into 24 
tendering and bidding process (Kerridge et al., 2000, Halaris et al., 2001), which is the most serious 25 
process for corruption (Agbiboa, 2012, Bowen et al., 2012, Oyewobi et al., 2011, Ray et al., 1999). 26 
Around 35% of respondents of a recent UK survey by CIOB (2013) believe that the tendering and bidding 27 
process is the most vulnerable to corruption in construction sector. For Europe as a whole, direct loss due 28 
to corruption in the tendering and bidding process for road and rail construction, water and waste 29 
construction, urban and utility construction is estimated to be 17%, 7% and 20% of project prices 30 
respectively (EU (2013), while in Japan, corruption in the tendering and bidding process is said to be 31 
responsible for 16% to 33% of project prices (McMillan, 1991). 32 
As the world biggest construction market, China has been experiencing more serious corruption in 33 
tendering and bidding process (Zou, 2006). According to China Business Weekly (2014), there are CNY 34 
10 trillion (USD 1.6 trillion) public construction projects calling for tenders annually, with an estimated 35 
corruption cost of CNY 800 billion (USD 128.4 billion) during the tendering and bidding process, i.e. 8% 36 
of the total procured value. The National Bureau of Corruption Prevention report 21766 cases of 37 
corruption recorded in the public construction sector between 2009 and 2012, 3305 of which occurred in 38 
the tendering and bidding process - accounting for 15.2 % of all reported cases (Xinhua Net, 2012). At the 39 
same time in Beijing, as many as 65% of construction corruption cases occur in the tendering and bidding 40 
process each year (zhao, 2012). 41 
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In the tendering and bidding process, business to government (B2G) corruption is ubiquitous (Luo, 2004). 42 
B2G corruption involves government officials and construction personnel, who conduct exchanges under 43 
the patron–client relationship (Wang, 2014), such as government officials disclosing important project 44 
information to help a specific construction enterprise win the tender. By doing so, they gain illegal 45 
benefits at the expense of the whole society. According to Wangyi Net (2014), almost 20 senior 46 
government officials have been involved in corruption during the tendering and bidding process of 47 
railway construction projects, helping 23 giant state owned constructors win 57 express railway projects 48 
with the total investment of CNY 178.8 billion (USD 28.79 billion) in return for more than CNY 3.1 49 
billion (USD 0.499 billion). 50 
A number of studies have been conducted to identify the reasons for construction B2G corruption. Some 51 
point out that this is because the government in China controls many construction projects, especially the 52 
larger ones, and officials at various levels possess considerable power to monopolize these projects (Gao, 53 
2011, Walder, 1995). Other factors include lack of supervisory institutions and transparency (Le et al., 54 
2014a, Le et al., 2014b), information asymmetry (Xiang and Xie, 2008), complexity of projects (Chan et 55 
al., 2004, Zou et al., 2007) and cultural issues (Li, 2011a, Luo, 2008).  56 
However, although dozens of tendering and bidding B2G corruption cases are uncovered each year, far 57 
more frequently than in other stages, very little is known with certainty of the reason why B2G corruption 58 
is widespread wholly in the tendering and bidding process (Zhang et al., 2015). A more detailed analysis 59 
is needed to help reduce and ultimately eliminate corruption at this stage. Therefore, the purpose of this 60 
study is to identify and analyze the causes of B2G corruption in tendering and bidding for Chinese 61 
construction projects. 62 
LITERATURE REVIEW 63 
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B2G corruption 64 
Generally speaking, corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain and can be 65 
divided into two categories: B2B (business to business) corruption and B2G (business to government) 66 
corruption, where B2G corruption happens between businesspersons and government officials while B2B 67 
corruption occurs between businesspersons (Fan, 2002, Lindskog et al., 2010). Compared with B2B 68 
corruption, B2G corruption has received widespread public attention, because rent-seeking government 69 
officials who regulate the market can abuse their power to bypassing laws and regulations (Melese, 2002).  70 
Construction sector  includes projects initiated by both governments and private sectors (Stansbury, 2005), 71 
involving numerous parties, various processes, different phases of work, and a great deal of inputs (Takim 72 
and Akintoye, 2002). All participants could be involved in corruption, including government officials, 73 
funders, project owners, contractors, consultants, suppliers as well as the business and professional 74 
associations (Bowen et al., 2012). Many forms of corruption are practiced, the most frequently mentioned 75 
being client abuses (Williamson et al., 2004, May et al., 2001), bribery, fraud, collusion (Zarkada-Fraser 76 
and Skitmore, 1997, Zarkada-Fraser, 2000, Zarkada-Fraser and Skitmore, 2000, Zarkada-Fraser et al., 77 
1998), bid rigging, embezzlement, kickback, conflict of interest, etc. (Le et al., 2014b).  78 
The tendering and bidding process is particularly vulnerable, with more than 50 forms of corruption being 79 
found by the India Central Vigilance Commission (2012) for example. B2G corruption also affects 80 
tendering and bidding activities with special severity, since the tendering and bidding determines which 81 
enterprises win the construction projects. 82 
The situation in China is no different, where existing corruption cases suggest that winning construction 83 
projects sometimes depends on the relationship with officials to gain competitive advantages (Alutu, 84 
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2007). There is also a wide variety of forms of B2G corruption in the tendering and bidding process in 85 
China, which makes the anti-B2G corruption almost a mission impossible (Li et al., 2013). 86 
 87 
 88 
Causes of corruption in construction 89 
Since the ancient Egyptians, there is an absolute agreement that corruption is a cancer on society that 90 
needs to be removed (Araia, 2013). In pursuit of this, a wave of theoretical and empirical research has 91 
been conducted on the causes of corruption (Myint, 2000).  92 
Theoretically, Jain (2001) points out there are three prerequisites for corruption: bureaucratic 93 
discretionary power, the association of this power with economic rents, and deterrence as a function of the 94 
probability of being caught and penalized. According to ‘Fraud Triangle’ theory, corruption opportunity, 95 
need or pressure and rationalization are the three legs of corruption in the tendering and bidding process. 96 
Corruption opportunity acts like a magnet to attract parties with the potential capacity to engage in corrupt 97 
activities (Bowen et al., 2012). For corruption need or pressure, there are two distinct forms: committed 98 
knowingly and deliberately for personal or corporate gain, and committed reluctantly in the belief that it 99 
is necessary to conduct these practices (GIACC and TI, 2008). Corruption rationalization is the 100 
individuals’ attempt to justify past and future corrupt deeds to themselves and others, and alleviate their 101 
moral anxiety via the fields of psychoanalysis and social psychology (Zyglidopoulos et al., 2009). In 102 
addition, according to the decision making process, the illegal practice may be as a result of internal 103 
factors, external factors, situational factors, etc. (Zarkada-Fraser and Skitmore, 2000, Zarkada-Fraser, 104 
2000). 105 
6 
 
Empirically, many causes of corruption have been identified in the construction sector, including 106 
deregulation of the infrastructure sector, large flow of public money, fierce competition, lack of 107 
transparent selection criteria for projects, political interference and discretion, the monopolistic nature of 108 
service delivery, tight margins, close relationships between contractors and the complexity of institutional 109 
roles (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003, Rodriguez et al., 2005, Stansbury and Stansbury, 2007, de Jong et 110 
al., 2009, Sohail and Cavill, 2008, Gunduz and Önder, 2013). Moreover, the nature of construction 111 
projects, such as their complex contractual structure, diversity of skills, and the numerous levels of 112 
bureaucracy for obtaining official approvals and permits, facilitates corruption and makes it difficult to 113 
detect and prevent (Stansbury and Stansbury, 2006, Fukuyama, 2005, Krishnan, 2009).  114 
In China, there are additional causes due to its unique condition:  its construction market is imperfect with 115 
much trade monopoly and regional protectionism; government officials interfere in public construction 116 
projects without constraint (Ren and Sun, 2005); and the construction market has a flawed regulation 117 
system and lacks a positive industrial climate (Le et al., 2014a).  118 
Furthermore, corruption is often viewed as a cultural problem, especially in developing countries (Sohail 119 
and Cavill, 2008). In China, guanxi, the informal personal relationships that facilitate the exchange of 120 
favors between people (Bian, 1997, Lovett et al., 1999, Leung et al., 2005), is embedded deeply in the 121 
culture (Li and Sheng, 2011). Guanxi is the key to analyzing and understanding Chinese conduct, and 122 
provides a “lubricant”(Standifird and Marshall, 2000, Hui and Graen, 1998, Gold and Guthrie, 2002) that 123 
helps the Chinese to get through life, even called “guanxi capitalism” (Lu et al., 2008). However, like two 124 
sides of a coin, guanxi has its good points and bad points (Warren et al., 2004), many scholars equate 125 
guanxi with corruption and bribery (Koo and Obst, 1995, Smeltzer and Jennings, 1998, Steidlmeier, 126 
1999), even taking guanxi to be synonymous with bureaucratic corruption and bribery (Sanyal, 2005, Su 127 
and Littlefield, 2001, Su et al., 2003). 128 
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Thus, having good guanxi with government officials means being prioritized to win projects because 129 
good guanxi simply indicates that the government trusts you have the ability to accomplish the task (Guo 130 
and Miller, 2010). Resorting to guanxi to win construction projects has become a latent rule in China (Ren, 131 
2012). Consequently, guanxi provides a fertile environment for corruption to flourish (Hoskisson et al., 132 
2000, Tsui et al., 2004). 133 
As shown in Table 1, a total of 15 root causes of construction corruption have been identified from the 134 
literature review, including legal and regulation factors, market factors, project factors and personal 135 
factors.  136 
 137 
Table 1 Causes of corruption in construction projects  138 
Causes 
Bowen et 
al. (2012) 
Zarkada-Fraser and 
Skitmore (2000), 
(Zarkada-Fraser, 
2000) 
Le et al. 
(2014a) 
Sohail and 
Cavill (2008) 
Zou 
(2006) 
(Zhang 
et al., 
2015) 
1 Flawed regulation system X X X X X X 
2 Regional protectionism － － － － － X 
3 Abuse of power X － － X X － 
4 Absence of penalties － X － － － － 
5 Lack of rigorous supervision － － X － X － 
6 Lack positive climate X X X － X － 
7 Lack of transparency － － － X － － 
8 Fierce competition － X X － － X 
9 Complex market － － － X X － 
10 Large flow of public money － － － X － － 
11 high margin － － － － － X 
12 Economic survival X － － － － X 
13 Personal greed(moral) X X X － X － 
14 Professional code － X X X X － 
15 Relationship/guanxi influence X － － X － X 
 139 
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Although various causes of corruption in construction have been identified, very limited focus on B2G 140 
corruptions specifically. Additionally, previous research regarding corruption in the construction sector 141 
has primarily focused on the whole construction industry, few studies have been attempted in the 142 
tendering and bidding process (Zhang et al., 2015).Therefore, causes of B2G corruption in tendering and 143 
bidding process remain largely unknown. Given that B2G corruption in the tendering and bidding stage 144 
has a severe negative impact on the effectiveness of government investment and quality of construction 145 
projects along with the unique legal, cultural and economic system in China, the underlying reasons for 146 
B2G corruption in tendering and bidding stages need further investigation.  147 
RESEARCH METHODS 148 
The research process consisted of three steps. First, a thorough literature review to identify a preliminary 149 
list of 15 causes of corruption in construction. Second, the use of semi-structured interviews with 150 
experienced practitioners to identify further causes specifically for B2G corruption in the tendering and 151 
bidding stages. Finally, a questionnaire survey is described to prioritize and categorize these causes. 152 
To ensure the reliability of interview result, semi-structured interviews were conducted with practitioners:  153 
(1) have at least ten years of working experience in the construction sector, (2) hold senior positions in 154 
their organizations and (3) have high education degrees. As a result, 9 practitioners were selected 155 
comprising 2 construction company CEOs, 3 vice CEOs and 4 project managers, all of whom have more 156 
than ten years working experience in the construction sector and involved in the tendering and bidding 157 
activities in numerous public construction projects. The reason for the combination of experts from 158 
different backgrounds is to provide a balanced view of the research topic and obtain a range of 159 
perspectives from different firms. Given that the majority of the literature on corruption is focused on the 160 
recipients (government officials), this study examines the issue from the bribe-givers’ (construction firms) 161 
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point of view (Gao, 2011, Li and Ouyang, 2007).  Each semi-structured interview took approximately half 162 
an hour. The 15 causes of B2G corruption were presented to the interviewees at the beginning of the 163 
interviews and, using these as a reference, they were requested to identify the causes of B2G corruption 164 
according to their own experience. After the interviews, content analysis was used to analyze the 165 
transcripts and identify the causes of B2G corruption. Content analysis is often used to determine the 166 
major facets of a set of data by simply counting the number of times an activity happens or a topic is 167 
depicted (Ye et al., 2014, Fellows and Liu, 2009, Xia and Chan, 2012). As a result, a total of 24 causes of 168 
B2G corruption in the tendering and bidding process were identified. 169 
For the survey, a questionnaire was developed based on the 24 causes of B2G corruption identified from 170 
the semi-structured interviews, with the respondents being requested to rate the importance of each cause 171 
on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1=significant unimportant, 7=significant important). In order to maximize 172 
the number of respondents, help was sought from the Shanghai Construction Consultants Association and 173 
Research Institute of Complex Engineering and Management at Tongji University. These two agencies 174 
have extensive contacts with various construction enterprises. In order to ensure the quality of the survey 175 
results, all the targeted respondents and their enterprises had been involved in a number of public 176 
construction projects in the past three years. Considering that corruption is a sensitive topic and it is 177 
extremely difficult to obtain data from government officials, the target respondents in this research are 178 
those from construction enterprises. A total of 211 questionnaires were distributed by e-mail and on-site 179 
distribution over a period of 3 months. 183 were returned, of which 41 were discarded due to incomplete 180 
information or obvious contradictions, e.g. the respondents thought it was difficult to understand the 181 
questionnaire or ticked the same option in all questions (Fang et al., 2006). The remaining 142 valid 182 
replies were recorded and used for the analysis. With a response rate of 67%, this satisfies the statistical 183 
significance requirements for the survey (Baruch and Holtom, 2008). 184 
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For the analysis, each cause is ranked according to its mean value and the set of most important causes 185 
identified by t-tests. Then a factor analysis is conducted to explore the underlying dimensions involved. 186 
Factor analysis is a statistical technique commonly adopted to identify a small number of individual 187 
factors beneath a set of interrelated variables (Choi et al., 2011). Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was 188 
used to identify the interrelationships between the items by the principal components method (Polit and 189 
Beck, 2008). This considers the total variance in the data and determines the minimum number of factors 190 
that account for the maximum variance in the dataset (Xia and Chan, 2012). This requires two essential 191 
stages of factor extraction and factor rotation. In order to test whether the data is suitable for factor 192 
analysis, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett's Test are first used. The KMO is an index for 193 
comparing whether the magnitudes of the observed correlation coefficients to the size of the partial 194 
correlation coefficients are small. The Bartlett's Test is for homogeneity of variance, a necessary 195 
condition for factor analysis.  196 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS 197 
Semi-structured interviews 198 
Table 2 summarizes the background of the experts involved in the semi-structured interviews, and the 199 
identified 24 causes are shown in Table 3. 200 
Table 2. Background of experts 201 
Experts Organization Position Years of experience 
A Contractor CEO 23 
B Consultant CEO 17 
C Contractor Vice CEO 11 
D Contractor Vice CEO 13 
E Consultant Vice CEO 12 
F Contractor Project Manager 10 
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G Contractor Project Manager 36 
H Consultant Project Manager 25 
I Consultant Project Manager 11 
 202 
Table 3. Summary of causes of B2G corruption in tendering and bidding process 203 
Number Causes of B2G corruption in tendering and bidding 
1 Higher margin for public investment projects 
2 Investment fund is enough and can easily be paid for public investment projects 
3 Cost of B2G corruption is small compared with its benefit 
4 Long term benefits could not be achieved without B2G corruption 
5 Tendering and bidding activities are often formalities  
6 Reducing risk of the market and competition 
7 Lack of a B2G corruption relationship disadvantages companies in competition 
8 Decision-making for public investment projects is defective 
9 Lack of standardization of government power 
10 Tendering and bidding legal system is not sound  
11 Government official power is over centralized 
12 Tendering and bidding activities lack social supervision 
13 Lack of effective judicial administration 
14 Tendering and bidding information not disclosed effectively and lack transparency 
15 Cut-throat competition to win construction projects is widespread  
16 Existing monopoly and market segmentation in the tendering and bidding process 
17 Rent-cost is too low 
18 It is hard to discover a B2G corruption relationship owing to its hidden nature 
19 B2G corruption can be conducted with the excuse of traditional culture and guanxi 
20 It is hard to win construction projects by strict compliance with the law 
21 Existing large numbers of off-site activities in the tendering and bidding process 
22 Lack of trust in the construction sector 
23 Lack of professional ethics 
24 Lack of specific ethics and code of conduct to guide the action of government officials 
  204 
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 205 
Questionnaire survey 206 
Table 4 provides detailed background information of the 142 respondents. All are from cities in eastern 207 
China, which contributes almost 40% of construction projects in the country (China Statistics Bureau, 208 
2013). 90% of respondents hold a college degree or above, 40% have more than 10 years’ experience, and 209 
approximately 40% hold managerial positions, which is sufficient to obtain a sound judgment. 210 
 211 
Table 4. Demographic Profile of Respondents 212 
Personal profile Categories Number of respondents Percentage 
Years of experience 
1-5 years 39 27.5 
5-10 years 45 31.7 
10-15 years 30 21.1 
Over 15 years 28 19.7 
Position 
Staff  88 62 
Project manager level 32 22.5 
Department manager level 11 7.7 
Top Manager level 11 7.7 
Education 
High school or below  28 9.9 
Junior college 58 29.6 
Bachelor’s degree 42 40.8 
Master’s degree or over 14 19.7 
Organization 
Contractor 31 21.8 
Quantity survey 13 9.2 
Supervision 42 29.6 
Consultant 56 39.4 
Ownership 
Private enterprises 116 81.7 
State-owned enterprises 20 14.1 
Foreign companies 4 2.8 
Joint enterprises 2 1.4 
 213 
Ranking of corruption causes 214 
13 
 
Cronbach’s alpha is 0.936, much greater than the cut-off of 0.6 (Carmines and Zeller, 1979), indicating 215 
the reliability of seven-point Likert-type scores is acceptable. The mean and standard deviation of the 216 
importance of each ranked cause are shown in Table 5. When two or more causes have the same mean 217 
value, the one with the lower standard deviation is considered to be more important (Wang and Yuan, 218 
2011). The mean scores of all the causes are over 5.0, indicating that all the causes are considered 219 
important.  220 
 221 
Table 5. Ranking of Causes of B2G corruption 222 
Causes of B2G corruption Mean Std. Deviation 
1. Lack of a B2G corruption relationship disadvantages companies in competition  5.803 1.119 
2. Existing large numbers of off-site activities in the tendering and bidding process 5.746 1.133 
3. Government official power is over centralized 5.739 1.122 
4. Investment fund is enough and can easily be paid for public investment projects 5.718 1.006 
5. Lack of effective judicial administration 5.718 1.181 
6. It is hard to discover a B2G corruption relationship owing to its hidden nature 5.711 1.069 
7. Rent-cost is too low 5.662 1.058 
8. Reducing risk of the market and competition 5.641 1.100 
9. Tendering and bidding activities lack social supervision 5.627 1.218 
10. Lack of specific ethics and code of conduct to guide the action of government officials 5.592 1.295 
11. Long term benefits could not be achieved without B2G corruption 5.556 1.164 
12. B2G corruption can be conducted with the excuse of traditional culture and guanxi 5.549 1.102 
13. It is hard to win construction projects by strict compliance with the law 5.500 1.213 
14. Cut-throat competition to win construction projects is widespread 5.415 1.106 
15. Existing monopoly and market segmentation in the tendering and bidding process 5.408 1.162 
16. Lack of standardization for government power 5.380 1.281 
17. Higher margin for public investment projects 5.345 1.130 
18. Tendering and bidding legal system is not sound 5.324 1.345 
19. Cost of B2G corruption is small compared with its benefit 5.310 1.118 
20. Decision-making for public investment projects is defective 5.268 1.231 
21. Lack of trust in the construction sector 5.254 1.274 
22. Tendering and bidding activities are often formalities 5.246 1.267 
23. Lack of professional ethics 5.225 1.431 
24. Tendering and bidding information not disclosed effectively and lack transparency 5.056 1.341 
14 
 
 223 
A series of t-tests helps to find the set of most important causes. For the top and second top means of 224 
5.803 and 5.746, the t-test (one-tailed) p=0.274. Now take the top and third top and continue in this way 225 
until p<0.05. This occurs at cause number 8, therefore the set of most important causes comprises the first 226 
7 causes on the list. That is 227 
1. Lack of a B2G corruption relationship disadvantages companies in competition  228 
2. Existing large numbers of off-site activities in the tendering and bidding process 229 
3. Government official power is over centralized 230 
4. Investment fund is enough and can easily be paid for public investment projects 231 
5. Lack of effective judicial administration 232 
6. It is hard to discover a B2G corruption relationship owing to its hidden nature 233 
7. Rent-cost is too low 234 
The importance of the first of these causes is unsurprising as it is well known that corruption in the 235 
Chinese construction sector is almost out of control (Zou et al., 2007), which leads to a severe external 236 
industry environment for construction enterprises. In order to survive and develop, enterprises are forced 237 
to indulge in corrupt activities with government officials. Some directly depend on B2G corruption to win 238 
construction projects. In this way, the industrial climate of the whole construction sector has gradually 239 
become less positive (Le et al., 2014a), so that construction enterprises have increasingly resorted to B2G 240 
corruption, as the lack of a B2G corruption relationship disadvantages companies in competition. In this 241 
situation, tendering and bidding laws cannot be successfully implemented and winning construction 242 
projects by B2G corruption has become the latent rule.  243 
The remaining causes refer to the ease of which corrupt activities are possible in China. Due to the whole 244 
tendering and bidding process involving many off-site activities, corruption activities are carried out 245 
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through a B2G corruption relationship in advance, with the tendering and bidding process being merely a 246 
formality. Government officials, possessing a powerful right of discretion in China, still play an important 247 
role in the tendering and bidding process. This, together with the lack of judicial administration and 248 
difficulty in detection makes corruption relatively easy. Similarly, the cost of corruption compared with 249 
the size of profit involved is relatively small. 250 
Therefore, the ease with which corrupt activities can be carried out because of off-site activities, overly 251 
powerful officials, lack of judicial administration, difficulty in detection and relatively low cost, and its 252 
ratchet effect on the whole industry making it difficult to win construction projects without B2G 253 
corruption are the main causes of corruption in construction tendering and bidding in China. 254 
 255 
Factor Analysis of Underlying Groupings 256 
Table 6 presents the results for the KMO and Bartlett's tests, with a KMO value of 0.901 and Bartlett’s 257 
significance of 0.000. According to Kaiser (1974), the KMO index value should be bigger than 0.5. It is 258 
therefore concluded that the correlation matrix is not an identity matrix, the correlation among the 259 
variables is strong, the variances are sufficiently homogeneous and hence the data is suitable for factor 260 
analysis. 261 
Table 6. Results of KMO and Bartlett's Test 262 
Parameter Value 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
0.901 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity  
 Approx. Chi-Square 2008.338 
 Degrees of freedom 276 
 Sig. 0.000 
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Using the principle components analysis and varimax methods, the factor analysis generates six factors 263 
with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, accounting for 70.54% of total variance explained, which satisfies the 264 
criteria that the eigenvalues should be greater than 1.0 and more than 60% of total variance should be 265 
explained (Norusis, 1992, Malhotra, 2008). To obtain a better understanding of the factor-loading matrix, 266 
factor rotation is used, and the factor loadings are sorted by size according to their coefficients. Table 6 267 
indicates the final factors and factor loadings. Each factor is named by the combining the meaning of their 268 
variables with the highest cross-factor loadings, and eliminated those with loadings less than 0.4 (Lee et 269 
al., 2004). These are (1) flawed regulation systems, (2) negative encouragement, (3) lack of professional 270 
ethics and codes of conduct, (4) illegitimate gains, (5) lack of competitive and inequitable bidding 271 
practices and (6) the guanxi mechanism.  272 
Table 7. Causal factors of B2G corruption  273 
Factors 
Factor 
loading 
Variance 
explained (%) 
Factor 1: Flawed regulation systems  14.114 
Lack of effective judicial administration 0.808  
Government official power is over centralized 0.730  
Tendering and bidding activities lack social supervision 0.692  
Tendering and bidding legal system is not sound 0.675  
Decision-making for public investment projects is defective 0.473  
Lack of standardization of government power 0.447  
Factor 2: Negative encouragement  12.658 
It is hard to win construction projects by strict compliance with the law 0.722  
Lack of a B2G corruption relationship disadvantages companies in competition 0.655  
Existing large numbers of off-site activities in the tendering and bidding process 0.631  
Long term benefits could not be achieved without B2G corruption 0.546  
Tendering and bidding activities are often formalities 0.523  
Factor 3: Lack of professional ethics and code of conduct  12.195 
Lack of professional ethics 0.866  
Lack of trust in the construction sector 0.806  
Lack of specific ethics and code of conduct to guide the action of government officials 0.708  
Factor 4: Illegitimate gain  12.171 
Higher margin for public investment projects 0.805  
Cost of B2G corruption is small compared with its benefit 0.763  
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Investment fund is enough and can easily be paid for public investment projects 0.750  
Reducing risk of the market and competition 0.608  
Factor 5: Lack of competitive and inequitable bidding practices  11.174 
Tendering and bidding information not disclosed effectively and lack transparency 0.810  
Existing monopoly and market segmentation in the tendering and bidding process 0.647  
Rent-cost is too low 0.615  
Cut-throat competition to win construction projects is widespread 0.578  
Factor 6: The guanxi mechanism  8.233 
B2G corruption can be conducted with the excuse of traditional culture and guanxi 0.714  
It is hard to discover a B2G corruption relationship owing to its hidden nature 0.679  
 274 
DISCUSSION OF FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS 275 
Factor 1: Flawed Regulation Systems 276 
The factor of ‘flawed regulation systems’ accounts for 14.11% of the total variance explained. This 277 
confirms the conclusion that flawed regulation systems are the main reason for B2G corruption in the 278 
tendering and bidding process (Le et al., 2014a). As Kagan (1989) indicates, the regulations themselves 279 
are substantively problematic and flawed products for the behavior of corruption, fraud, etc. In China, 280 
although the government has actively implemented more than a thousand anti-corruption regulations and 281 
laws, and increasingly competitive and formal market-supporting institutions have been gradually adopted, 282 
anti-corruption laws and institutions are poorly established (Ko and Weng, 2012, Chen and Wu, 2011). 283 
Regulations remain undeveloped and flawed. 284 
In the construction sector, the vague and ambiguous laws and regulations provide wide discretion in 285 
interpreting the meanings of current laws and regulations (YOW THIM and Zonggui, 2004). Government 286 
construction departments play multiple roles of policy makers, project funding owners and arrangers, and 287 
own discretionary power, making it easy for government officials to interfere in tendering and bidding 288 
activities. Lack of rigorous supervision aggravates the situation (Ko and Weng, 2011, Li et al., 2013). The 289 
departments supervising construction projects are sometimes a subsidiary body of the same departments 290 
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that administrate the tendering department. At the same time, transparency to the public, such as public 291 
media, should be improved and enhanced (Zou, 2006). Additionally, although China’s tendering and 292 
bidding laws have been in existence since only 2000, they still contain many deficiencies that have a 293 
weakening influence on anti-corruption as they are flexible and fragmented. It is therefore vital and urgent 294 
to develop more sophisticated and enforceable laws and regulations (YOW THIM and Zonggui, 2004).  295 
 296 
Factor 2: Negative Encouragement 297 
B2G corruption is a passive response to the challenges raised by the changing economic and legal 298 
environment in China (Huang and Rice, 2012). B2G corruption is becoming the norm for winning public 299 
construction projects (Zhang et al., 2015). There are many sources of corruption in China, such as the 300 
ambiguity of prequalifying criteria, owners’ deliberately splitting the larger projects into smaller ones, bid 301 
rigging, etc. In this situation, construction enterprises resort to bribing government officials in order to 302 
win the projects. In other words, B2G corruption is developed as a defensive approach to curb the lack of 303 
a positive industrial climate (Le et al., 2014a). Furthermore, it has become more attractive for firms to 304 
resort to establishing B2G corruption relationships for long-term benefits (Luo, 2004) as establishing and 305 
maintaining B2G guanxi costs a large amount of money and energy (Zhang et al., 2015).  Additionally, 306 
given that corruption is widespread in China, not having B2G corruption relationships leads to a 307 
contractor being competitively disadvantaged. As a result, construction enterprises tend to strengthen their 308 
B2G corruption relationships in defense. 309 
Factor 3: Lack of Professional Ethics and Code of Conduct 310 
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As Bowen et al. (2007) point out, the disparate nature of the construction industry makes it difficult to 311 
monitor behavior on an individual level, which makes the introduction of codes of practice seem to be the 312 
best way to bring about a change in practice. There are three distinct parts to the effective use of a code of 313 
conduct as a tool for dealing with corruption: drafting the code, implementing the code and enforcing the 314 
code (Gilman, 2005). However for government officials in China, there is still a lack of a clear code of 315 
conduct (Liu, 2008). In addition, the existing codes needs to be improved because they fail to be put into 316 
practice, meanwhile creating cognitive dissonance and corruption (Li, 2011a). Moreover, corrupt 317 
behavior is an ethical problem (Sohail and Cavill, 2008) and the lack of professional ethics leads to the 318 
spread of corruption (Zou, 2006). Li (2009), for example, found that engineering students receive little 319 
professional ethics education, leading to a lack of trustworthiness and responsibility. Furthermore, low 320 
levels of trust nurture corruption, which often creates a degree of tolerance toward corruption and 321 
nurturing expectations of such conduct. At the same time, distrust fosters a vicious circle of a tolerant or 322 
acquiescent attitude toward corruption (Morris and Klesner, 2010), elevating the amount of corruption in 323 
society and hence providing a justification for furthering such behavior (Xin and Rudel, 2004). 324 
Factor 4: Illegitimate Gain 325 
The motivation of corruption during the tendering process is to influence decision makers to favor 326 
individual contractor’s own benefits, including the ex-ante benefits and ex post benefits (Cheung et al., 327 
2011). The ex-ante benefit is that enterprises win construction projects. And by ex-ante corruption, the 328 
number of bidders can be reduced (Tullock, 2001). Of B2G corruption practices, government officials 329 
abuse their administration power to appoint bidders. In reality, many enterprises in China undertake 330 
construction projects beyond their capabilities by borrowing qualifications, obtaining projects without a 331 
tendering and bidding process, etc. (Zhao, 2011). For ex post benefits, corruption can bring outstanding 332 
benefits. It is stated that the net benefit from public investment projects is more over 20%, sometimes 333 
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even more than 50% (Liu, 2011), while the average for the whole construction sector about 3% (!!! 334 
INVALID CITATION !!! ). Furthermore, only 70% to 80% of construction enterprises obtain their 335 
private sector construction project payments (Zhang (2013). Therefore, as the profit for public 336 
construction projects is high and payments are guaranteed by government, legions of construction 337 
enterprises try to win these projects via B2G corruption.  338 
Factor 5: Lack of Competitive and Equitable Bidding Practices  339 
Stansbury and Stansbury (2006) indicates that greater transparency increases the difficulty in concealing 340 
corruption. The construction sector is a typical market with incomplete information due to the opaqueness 341 
of bidding information. In China, there is serious information asymmetry, such as irregular publishing of 342 
information, little information being released, and insufficient transparency in selection criteria, that is 343 
although there are rules and requirements on qualification examination content, bidding scoring method 344 
and rubric according to the tendering and bidding laws, almost 90 percent tender documments did not 345 
detail the corresponding contents (LE et al., 2014c). 346 
In this situation, disclosure of confidential information can create space for rent seeking and bring 347 
benefits for government officials. The rent cost for both government officials and construction enterprises 348 
is low, which can induce unfair practices and injustice for other disadvantaged groups. Furthermore, due 349 
to the great financial and tax contributions involved, local protectionism in the construction sector is 350 
rampant (Fan, 2012). According to a survey conducted by the Development Research Center of the State 351 
Council of China, construction sector local protectionism is ranked fourth of 36 industrial sectors (Li et al., 352 
2004). In this situation, local construction enterprises are sheltered from other external enterprises and 353 
compete unfairly. Thus, external enterprises have to depend on B2G corruption to overcome entry barriers 354 
to enter the regional market. Furthermore, in order to sustain their competitive advantage and extract 355 
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more rents from the regional market, the local enterprises also have to indulge in corrupt practices with 356 
government officials. Because of the lack of transparency and competition due to protectionism, its value 357 
and control by government officials is increasing (Ades and Tella, 1996). 358 
Factor 6: the Guanxi Mechanism 359 
Chinese guan is a cultural value acceptable in the Chinese market, and its abuse can lead to unethical 360 
practices, such as dishonesty, bribery, and corruption (Maximiano, 2007). Thus guanxi provides fertile 361 
soil in China for corruption to flourish (Hoskisson et al., 2000, Tsui et al., 2004). Firstly, guanxi is covert 362 
by nature. Utilizing the social institutions of reciprocity and custom of gift-giving via guanxi, the process 363 
of corruption serves as a tacit expression (Li, 2011b) to reduce the risks involved. Secondly, guanxi is a 364 
Chinese tradition, which can distort norms by falsely presenting certain illicit behaviors as standard and 365 
normatively acceptable practices. In this situation, B2G corruption is not some haphazard aggregation of 366 
sporadic acts, but follows certain rules and codes of conduct (Zhan, 2012). Therefore, guanxi helps to 367 
overcome the moral and cognitive barriers to corruption (Li, 2011b).  368 
CONCLUSIONS 369 
The focal point of this study is to understand the underlying influences on B2G corruption in tendering 370 
and bidding in China. In order to win construction projects, many bidders establish a variety of B2G 371 
corruption relationships with government officials. However, little is known of their causes. In this study, 372 
a total of 24 factors were identified through a combination of literature review and semi-structured 373 
interviews. Based on a survey of 142 Chinese construction industry practitioners, six underlying factors 374 
were revealed using factor analysis approach, comprising: ‘flawed regulation systems’, ‘negative 375 
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encouragement’, ‘lack of professional ethics and codes of conduct’, ‘illegitimate gains’, ‘lack of 376 
competitive and inequitable bidding practices’ and ‘the guanxi mechanism’. 377 
The findings of the study provide some practical implications for preventing B2G corruptions in 378 
developing countries. The main factor is the ease with which B2G corruption is possible in China. To 379 
correct this, as it is the flawed regulation system that has the biggest impact on B2G corruption, priority 380 
needs to be given to improvements in the tendering and bidding environment, including revising the 381 
tendering and bidding laws, strengthening supervision, increasing penalties and greater policing of the 382 
laws and regulations. Another important factor for anti B2G corruption is to establish and improve a 383 
unified and orderly national construction market system for fair competition, so each bidder wins 384 
construction projects on merit only. 385 
The findings of this study imply that the causes of B2G corruption in tendering and bidding are quite 386 
complicated and varied. Many causes identified, such as flawed regulation systems, lack of professional 387 
ethics and codes of conduct and lack of competitive and equitable bidding practices are common in other 388 
developing nations and likely to have equal emphasis. The influence of the guanxi mechanism is unique 389 
to China, however, and is needed to explore its role in B2G corruption to provide additional help in 390 
further understanding the causes of B2G corruption in China and develop the improved effectiveness of 391 
anticorruption measures. 392 
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